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Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the California Supreme
Court recognized that the interest in freedom from negligent infliction of
mental distress is a protectable interest, and that an accompanying physi-
cal injury need not exist in order to recover damages. The author presents
a discussion of the history and policies behind the right to recover from
negligently inflicted emotional distress. The author also discusses and
analyzes the court's opinion in Molien and agrees with the court that the
fears of opening the floodgate of litigation which before Molien precluded
recovery, was arbitrary. Finally, the author concludes that the holding is
part of a natural evolution *in the area of negligently inflicted emotional
distress, and discusses its probable impact.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,' the California
Supreme Court held that damages may be awarded for emotional
distress caused by the negligent conduct of another; with no cor-
responding claim of physical injury required for such recovery.
The high court decision reversed the state court of appeal which
had denied such damages. This note will discuss the history of
recovery for the negligent infliction of mental distress and policies
which until now have limited recovery. The Molien decision and
its future impact will then be analyzed, with the resulting conclu-
sion that the court was correct in its holding.
II. HISTORY OF THE LAw OF RECOVERY FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
A. Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress2
American courts first allowed recovery for emotional distur-
1. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
2. Intentionally inflicted mental distress is discussed here to underscore the
relevant difference between negligently and intentionally inflicted distress. Unless
otherwise noted, use of the term "mental distress" will be in reference to
emotional injury negligently inflicted. Furthermore, mental distress is a very
difficult phrase to define medically and legally. Many different terms have been
used to denote the same idea, such as emotional disturbance, mental suffering,
mental anguish, emotional distress, and emotional harm. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment j at 77-78 (1965); Schwartz, Neuroses Following
Trauma, TRmumA, Dec. 1959, at 32. See also Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEo. L.J. 1237 (1971). In this article
the author defines mental distress as "any traumatically induced reaction which is
bance only in conjunction with an intentional tort. Damages for
mental or emotional harm could be recovered if such harm were
inflicted as a result of defamation, malicious prosecution, false im-
prisonment, battery, or seduction. 3 Because these damages were
dependent upon violation of some recognized legal right, they
were termed "parasitic". 4 The courts looked to the particular cir-
cumstances of such cases and then determined whether the emo-
tional injury claimed by the plaintiff was likely to have resulted
from the defendant's actions. The courts felt that the principal
claim, the intentional tort, guaranteed that the emotional distur-
bance was genuine.5
Courts, however, soon realized that such a limitation on recov-
ery for emotional harm was too strict, and that under certain con-
ditions recovery should be allowed even in the absence of a
traditional tort. An independent cause of action for emotional dis-
tress was first recognized in the English case of Wilkinson v.
Downton.6 In that case, the defendant falsely told the plaintiff
that her husband had been in an accident and was laying in a
ditch with both legs broken. As a result, the plaintiff suffered
shock to her nervous system and serious physical consequences.
The American courts followed the English lead and permitted re-
covery for such emotional harm caused by unusually heartless
conduct. The type of conduct the courts wanted to prevent was
such as telling a simple-minded woman to dig up a "pot of gold"
under conditions of extreme public humiliation,7 or wrapping up a
gory dead rat and sending the package to a "sensitive soul."8
It was apparent by the first half of this century that a trend had
developed in American cases. The courts began imposing liability
for extreme or outrageous conduct calculated to cause serious
emotional distress by recognizing the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The rationale for recognizing this tort was
that a defendant's outrageous conduct made it reasonably certain
that the emotional injury was caused by defendant's conduct, that
medically detrimental to the individual." Id. at 1255. The author defines traumatic
stimulus as an "impact, force or event which acts upon an individual for a brief or
extended period of time, and can be either physical or purely psychic." Id. at 1248.
3. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1049 (1936). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS, at 51-52
(4th ed. 1971).
4. Magruder, supra note 3, at 1048.
5. See C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 914-45 (2d
ed. 1969) for a good review of the classic cases in which parasitic damages for emo-
tional harm were allowed.
6. [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
7. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
8. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931).
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the injury was of a severe nature, and that it was not feigned.9 It
was the magnitude and severity of defendant's conduct which
gave credibility to plaintiff's claim for emotional injury damages,
serving as an objective criterion for evaluating the plaintiffs emo-
tional harm.
The Restatement Second of Torts has adopted this reasoning
stating that the intentional infliction of mental distress consti-
tutes an independent tort.10 Under the Restatement rule, dam-
ages for mental distress are no longer merely a parasitic element,
but an injury serious enough in its own right to warrant legal pro-
tection."
B. Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress
In contrast, where mental distress was negligently caused, the
courts appeared more cautious. Such caution stems from the
courts' fear of trivial and fraudulent claims.' 2 The courts seem to
believe that an alleged emotional injury occasioned by merely
negligent, as opposed to extreme and outrageous intentional con-
duct, is less likely to be genuine or severe enough to warrant com-
pensation.
The courts, however, did recognize that a total bar against re
9. For a review of the development of intentional infliction of mental distress
and the policies involved, see Magruder, supra note 3 at 1033; Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939); Vold, Tort
Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 18 NEB. L. BuLL. 222
(1939).
10. "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
11. "The interest in freedom from severe emotional distress is regarded as of
sufficient importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended to invade
it." State Rubbish Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 337, 240 P.2d 282, 285 (1952),
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46, comment d at 72-73 (Supp. 1948)). Several
courts have allowed recovery for intentionally inflicted mental distress despite the
absence of physical harm. See Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954);
Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So. 2d 154 (1963).
12. The following articles trace the development of the law with regard to neg-
ligently inflicted mental distress: Bohlen & Polikoff, Liability in New York for the
Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 409 (1932);
Harper & McNeely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Dis-
tress, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 426; Magruder, supra note 3, at 1033; Smith, Relation of
Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L.
REV. 193. See also Greyson, Recent Developments in the Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Shock, 3 N. KY. ST. L.F. 76 (1975).
covery for negligently inflicted emotional harm was too extreme
and that under some circumstances, justice required recognition
of such a cause of action. Thus, the courts allowed a plaintiff to
maintain a cause of action for negligently inflicted mental dis-
tress, but only in the presence of special limiting and qualifying
factors, thereby ensuring the credibility of plaintiff's claim. Such
factors existed where the emotional harm was accompanied by
some discernible physical injury caused by the negligent act. 13 It
was the physical manifestation of the emotional injury which the
courts viewed as a guarantee that the claim was genuine and se-
vere enough to warrant compensation.14
Although the general rule was that no action would lie for the
negligent infliction of mental distress absent a physical symptom,
there had been exceptions. As in a case where it was apparent
from the particular circumstances that the harm was genuine and
serious. In one group of cases involving telegraph companies,
emotional harm resulting from the negligent transmission of a
message (such as one announcing death), was compensated even
absent physical manifestation,15 because the message itself re-
vealed the likelihood of the emotional harm. A second group of
cases involved the negligent mishandling of corpses.' 6 An in-
dependent right of recovery for emotional harm was recognized,
apparently because the courts believed that such harm to close
friends and relatives of the deceased is clearly foreseeable. Thus,
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965): "If the actor's conduct is
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emo-
tional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone,
without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such
emotional disturbance." See Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88,
89 (1897). The plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's subway, was frightened by the
manner in which defendant's conductor treated a drunken passenger. The court
held there could be no recovery for fright where there was no injury to the person
from without. In Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), the
plaintiff was waiting to board a horsedrawn trolley which was negligently stopped
in such a way that the plaintiff was standing between the horses' heads. Although
she was not touched, plaintiff was frightened, fainted and shortly thereafter suf-
fered a miscarriage. The court held there could be no recovery for any physical
consequences resulting from fright alone.
14. Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138, 140, 113 A. 16, 17
(1921) (if no bodily injury, then no premise upon which to base a conclusion of
mental suffering). See Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to
Reason, 7 ViLL. L. REV. 232, 233-34 (1962); Note, Negligently Caused Mental Dis-
tress: Should Recovery Be Allowed? 13 S. D. L. REV. 402 (1968).
15. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cleveland, 169 Ala. 131, 53 So. 80 (1910); Metzer
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Lane, 152 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Nitka v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149
Wis. 106, 135 N.W. 492 (1912).
16. Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181
(1959); Torres v. State, 34 Misc. 2d 488, 228 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1962); Lott v. State, 32
Misc. 2d 296, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1962).
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where the courts have had some external assurance that the
claim was worthy of redress, recovery has been allowed.
The requirement of a physical manifestation was not the only
standard used by the courts to ensure the credibility of the emo-
tional injury claim. The "impact rule" became widely accepted in
one form or another. Under this rule courts were willing to per-
mit recovery, despite no apparent physical injury, when the cause
of action had been established by a physical impact.17 For exam-
ple, in Zelinsky v. Chimics,18 the plaintiff was involved in a minor
automobile accident. The court held that although there was no
apparent physical injury, the impact of collision alone was suffi-
cient to allow recovery for resulting mental disturbance, since the
degree of physical impact could also provide assurances that the
alleged claim was not illusory.19
The "impact rule," however, had its faults as could be seen by
the way in which the courts strained in their application of the
rule. In Morton v. Stack,20 a child suffered mental disturbance as
a result of being trapped in a burning building. The court held
that smoke inhaled by the child constituted sufficient physical im-
pact to assure an actual injury.21 Such decisions resulted in
harsh and anomalous results 22 and have led to the virtual aban-
17. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896); Huston v.
Freemansburg Boro., 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905). Parasitic damages for mental
distress often accompanied a cause of action established by the physical impact.
Without a physical impact, however, there was no recognized cause of action upon
which relief for mental distress could be granted. Thus, large awards for emo-
tional injury were granted although the physical impact was slight. However, no
such award was recognized if physical impact of some sort could not be estab-
lished.
18. 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961).
19. Id. at 318, 175 A.2d at 354.
20. 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
21. Id.
22. The impact requirement was often satisfied by minimal contact. See Ken-
tucky Traction & Term. Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929)
(a trifling burn); Porter v. Del. Lack. & W. R.R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (Sup. Ct.
1906) (dust in eyes); Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925) (mouse
hair in stew touched the roof of plaintiff's mouth). At times the requirement was
reduced to an absurdity: Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E.
680 (1928) (horse "evacuated its bowels" into plaintiff's lap). While recovery was
granted for trivial impacts, serious emotional harm with resulting physical damage
would often go uncompensated because the negligent conduct causing the mental
distress failed to produce any "impact." See Boden v. Del-Mar Garage Inc., 205
Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933) (wife denied recovery after seeing a car strike her hus-
band); Blessington v. Autry, 105 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (recovery denied to a
mother who witnessed her child's fatal injury).
donment of the "impact rule" by a majority of the states today.23
Due to the flaws in the "impact rule," a more liberal approach
for allowing compensation for negligently inflicted mental distress
was developed by the courts. 24 Although recovery continued to
be viewed exclusively as parasitic damages, 25 courts came to re-
quire only that the plaintiff suffer subsequent physical injury re-
sulting directly from the negligently inflicted mental distress. 2 6 In
addition, the courts applying this approach often considered
whether the mental distress and its consequences caused the
plaintiff to fear for his own safety. Recovery was denied if he did
not fear for his safety. This was especially true in bystander
cases where the plaintiff suffered mental distress as a result of
defendant's negligent injury of a third party.27
Instead of fear for personal safety, some courts used a "zone of
danger" test. This theory enabled a plaintiff to recover if he could
prove that he was in a physical zone of peril created by the negli-
gent act.28 The rationale behind this theory was that it was rea-
sonably foreseeable that a plaintiff would fear for his own safety
23. Prosser has suggested that the "impact rule" is almost certainly destined
for extinction. W. PROSSER supra note 3, at 332. See also Lambert, Tort Liability
for Psychic Injuries, 41 B.U. L. REV. 58 (1961).
24. See W. PROSSER supra note 3, at 332.
25. Courts still limited recovery to instances where plaintiff would have had a
cause of action regardless of this mental distress. See Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Mc-
Bride, 36 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1930). The fact that the plaintiff suffered physical in-
jury as a part of the aggregate attending results precluded the defense that the
connection between the negligent cause and the resulting nervous shock was too
remote for legal contemplation and replaced the narrower impact limitations. Id.
at 842. See, Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941)
(mental pain and suffering only compensable when made an element of damages);
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (mental suffering
compensable where wrongful act infringed upon legal right); Becker v. Borough of
Schuylkill Haven, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 189 A.2d 764 (1963) (plaintiff must furnish
basis for damages according to some definite legal rule).
26. See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (action allowed for
physical injury directly caused by defendant's negligence despite lack of impact);
Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890) (miscarriage suffered from witnessing
assault held compensable). But see Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d
232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952) (loss of sleep and severe distress from receiving wrong
baby not recoverable).
27. The dual requirements of the injury approach are apparent in Bowman v.
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933), where the defendant negligently drove his
truck into the plaintiff's house, causing injuries to the latter arising from fear for
her safety as well as for the safety of her children. The court held that recovery
should be allowed where clear and substantial physical injury resulted from fright
directly attributable to the defendant's negligent act. Id. at 404, 165 A. at 184. See
also Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Falzone v. Busch, 45
N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970).
28. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) is the leading case
with respect to the zone-of-danger test. Here plaintiff-husband sought recovery for
the wrongful death of his wife, who allegedly died as a result of emotional shock
after witnessing, from her window, a negligent motorist strike and kill her infant
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if he were in this zone, thus adding credibility to his claim of
mental distress. This theory solved the problem of adequately
proving the genuineness of the claim, a problem which the "im-
pact rule" sought to resolve by requiring an actual physical im-
pact. The courts believed the "zone of danger" test would
eliminate this artificial barrier to recovery for plaintiffs with legiti-
mate claims. The "zone of danger" test eventually became the
majority viewpoint in this country.29
As the foregoing suggests, the courts have been less than con-
sistent in their approach to recovery for infliction of mental dis-
tress. The courts have continued to express fears that unlimited
and undeserved liability will result from an extension of in-
dependent protection to mental equilibrium. 30 These American
courts have repeatedly rationalized that it would be impossible to
weed out false claims, 31 that a flood of litigation would ensue,32
and that defendants would be subject to liability without a corre-
sponding degree of culpability.33 Molien brought out that these
fears depict the arbitrariness of public policy decisions and raise
questions concerning the wisdom of cutting off liability on a per
daughter. The Wisconsin Supreme Court approached the problem in terms of the
absence of a duty owed by defendant to those outside the zone of danger.
29. 2 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS, at 1034 (1956).
30. See Lambert, supra note 23, at 585; Smith, Relation to Emotions to Injury
and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 U. VA. L. REV. 193, at 198
(1944).
31. See McCardle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 271 Mo. 111, 195 S.W. 1034
(1917) (fearing of opening the door to false claims); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R.,
65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (court must guard against feigned injuries
and speculative claims); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958) (for
every wholly genuine claim, there would be a tremendous number of false ones).
32. See Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917
(1900) (concern over false claims and flood of new litigation); Ward v. West Jersey
& Seashore R.R. Co., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (agreeing with other
courts that a flood of litigation might ensue); Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex.
641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953) (fear that a "wide door" would be opened to fictitious
claims).
33. See Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965) (compensating
mental distress would burden the courts and defendants); Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (concern over
a lack of duty owed to plaintiff by defendant), overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). The court rejected the argument that
inability to fix limits of liability justified the absolute denial of recovery. Instead it
concluded that a test based on reasonable foreseeability could adequately fix lim-
its of recovery. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79. See also Waube v.
Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (fear that liability would be wholly
out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasor).
se basis. In Molien, the majority held that liability could not be
cut-off on such a per se basis.
Several American jurisdictions have shown dissatisfaction with
the traditional approach and have indicated a greater willingness
to abandon unnecessarily restrictive tests in determining liability.
This willingness exists because these particular courts have rec-
ognized the increasing complexity of society and the growing
competence of medical science in determining the existence and
extent of mental injuries. 34 By disposing of arbitrary restrictions,
these courts have shown that they recognize that freedom from
mental distress should be protected.35 Furthermore, these courts
have provided protection by applying such traditional tort princi-
ples as foreseeability.3 6 For example, in Dillon v. Legg,3 7 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court defined those circumstances under which a
tortfeasor has a duty to refrain from negligently causing a by-
stander to suffer mental distress. 38
Finally, these jurisdictions have shown their reluctance to deny
recovery on a per se basis, by recognizing that certain kinds of
mental injury are marked by definite physical symptoms which
are capable of medical proof.39
In Rodrigues v. State,40 the Supreme Court of Hawaii con-
fronted the issue of whether a plaintiffs interest in freedom from
mental distress should be accorded independent legal protec-
34. See Batalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34,
37 (1961). The plaintiff was not barred from recovering damages for severe emo-
tional and neurological disturbances by any artificial test or rule. While riding in a
chairlift at a ski resort, she was severely frightened when a state employee negli-
gently forgot to close the safety bar on her chair. In its opinion, the court stated
that it would look to whether "there is a real connection between the ultimate
damage and the original wrong." Id.
35. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d
996, 999 (1958) (the court specifically held that freedom from mental disturbance
was a protected interest in the State of New York).
36. See Wallace v. Coca-Cola, 269 A.2d 117, 118, 122 (Me. Sup. Ct. 1970) (the
court held that the plaintiff's mental and emotional suffering was compensable if it
were reasonably foreseeable and manifested by objective symptoms).
37. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
38. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court held that the
determination of whether mental injuries may be foreseeable, and thus a defend-
ant liable, depends upon three factors: (1) the plaintiff's physical proximity to the
negligent act; (2) whether the shock occurs from plaintiffs direct observation or
subsequent communication from a third person; and (3) the relationship of plain-
tiff to the victim.
39. See Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970). The defendant
negligently caused an electrical explosion, which frightened two children who
were nearby. The court found that one of the children should be given an opportu-
nity on remand to prove allegations of traumatic neurosis, nervousness, and emo-
tional disturbance since these reactions constituted objective and physical
injuries.
40. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
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tion.41 In its opinion, the court noted the pervasive expansion of
psychic stimuli in modern society and the growing understanding
of the debilitating effects of mental distress. From these observa-
tions, the court concluded that negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress is entitled to independent legal protection. 42 The opinion,
however, failed to adequately support its holding. That is, the
court failed to sufficiently consider whether mental distress is
detrimental enough to warrant independent legal protection, and
whether it is capable of the objective proof required for such pro-
tection. It is due to the existence of such questions that most ju-
risdictions have refused to extend legal protection to mental
equilibrium.43 In Molien, however, the court answered these
questions in the affirmative, and in doing so, extended legal pro-
tection of mental equilibrium to its most liberal point yet.
III. MOLIEN V. KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS
A. Facts
Plaintiff Stephen Molien and his wife Valerie Molien were
members of the Kaiser Health Plan. Mrs. Molien went to Kaiser
for a routine physical examination where she allegedly was negli-
gently examined and tested by Kaiser staff physician Dr. Kil-
bridge. As a result of the doctor's alleged negligence, Mrs. Molien
was misdiagnosed as having contracted an infectious type of
syphilis. Due to this diagnosed condition, Mrs. Molien underwent
treatment which included massive and unnecessary doses of pen-
icillin. It was further alleged that on account of Dr. Kilbridge's
conduct, Mrs. Molien suffered "injury to her body and shock and
injury to her nervous system."
Mrs. Molien was instructed to advise her husband of her diag-
nosis and plaintiff was required to undergo tests in order to deter-
mine whether he too had contracted syphilis. Plaintiff's tests
were negative.
41. The suit in Rodrigues was instituted under the Hawaii State Tort Liability
Act. The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that the state highway department was
negligent in failing to protect the plaintiff-homeowner from flood damage caused
by improper drainage of surface water following the blockage of a highway culvert.
The plaintiffs home was flooded, and extensive damage was caused. Mrs. Rodri-
gues testified that she was "shocked" at what had become of the home that she
and her husband had waited 15 years to build. Recovery was based on the mental
distress caused by the property damage, not upon the property damage itself. Id.
42. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
43. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
As a result of the alleged negligent diagnosis, Mrs. Molien be-
came highly upset believing that her husband was engaged in ex-
tramarital sexual activities. The plaintiff claimed that such
suspicion led to tension and hostility between the spouses, and
ultimately caused the dissolution of their marriage. Finally, it
was alleged that the events stemming from the negligent misdiag-
nosis, caused plaintiff to suffer "extreme emotional distress."
The plaintiff filed his complaint against Kaiser Foundation Hos-
pitals and Dr. Kilbridge, praying for damages for mental suffering
and loss of consortium alleging that as a consequence of defend-
ant's acts plaintiff had been deprived of the love, companionship,
affection, society, sexual relations, solace, support, and services of
his wife.
Plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court from a judg-
ment entered after a general demurrer was sustained by the state
court of appeal.
B. The California Supreme Court Analysis
1. Determining Whether Defendant Owes A Duty: Is Mental
Distress a Reasonably Foreseeable Consequence of
Defendant's Negligent Act?
The court" held that a right of recovery exists for negligently
inflicted mental distress absent a corresponding claim of physical
injury. In determining whether a defendant should be held liable
for a negligent act which caused the mental distress, the critical
question is foreseeability of risk. Justice Mosk cited Dillon v.
Legg,45 wherein this court stated: "In order to limit the otherwise
potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent
act, the law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to
others which to defendant at the time were reasonably foresee-
able."46 This foreseeable risk was not limited to actual physical
impact but applied to emotional injury as well.4 7
In Dillon,48 foreseeability of the mental distress to the plaintiff
was said to be based on several factors. 49 Though these factors
44. The majority was comprised of five justices: Chief Justice Bird and Jus-
tices Mosk, Tobriner, Newman and Manuel. The dissent was comprised of two jus-
tices: Clark and Richardson. Mr. Justice Mosk wrote the opinion for the majority
while Mr. Justice Clark authored the dissenting opinion.
45. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
46. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
47. Id. at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
48. In Dillon a mother sought damages for emotional trauma and physical in-
jury that resulted when she witnessed the negligently inflicted death of her daugh-
ter.
49. See note 38 supra.
[Vol. 8: 817, 1981] Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
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served to determine damages suffered by the witness to an injury
of a third person, the court felt these factors were inapplicable
where, as in Molien, the plaintiff himself was a direct victimSO of
the assertedly negligent act. Thus, the court borrowed only the
general principle of foreseeability from Dillon and held that de-
termination is to be based on the facts at hand on a case by case
basis. Such use of the general principle of foreseeability, how-
ever, is adequate to fix limits of recovery; therefore, the court was
correct in abandoning the rigid standards established by Dillon.5 1
Negligence has always been defined as conduct which falls be-
low a standard established by the law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm. 52 The idea of risk necessarily
involves a recognizable danger, i.e., foreseeable danger, based
upon some knowledge of the existing facts and some reasonable
belief that harm may follow. 53 A risk is a danger which is appar-
ent, or should be apparent, to one in the position of the actor 4
Here, it is clear that the risk of mental distress to the plaintiff in
Molien was apparent to the defendant physician. In holding that
the risk of harm to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable to defend-
ants, the court emphasized the probable effect of an erroneous di-
agnosis of syphilis. Since syphilis is normally transmitted only by
sexual relations, a spouse is likely to suspect the other spouse of
extramarital relations, and such suspicion would likely cause anx-
iety, hostility, emotional distress and marital discord.5 5 Further-
more, the plaintiff was a specifically foreseeable victim, as Dr.
50. In Molien, the plaintiff was a direct victim in that the defendant's negligent
misdiagnosis of plaintiff's wife showing her to have syphilis gave rise to the
probability that the plaintiff also had syphilis, and such negligence deprived plain-
tiff of companionship, affection, and sexual enjoyment.
51. See note 42 supra (where serious mental distress to plaintiff was a reason-
ably foreseeable consequence of defendant's act, defendant's liability would be
imposed by application of general tort principles).
52. See generally W. PROSSER at 236-98. The important inquiry in cases of re-
covery for mental distress should be expressed in terms of foreseeability, proxi-
mate cause, and duty. Proximate cause establishes what results flow from
defendant's negligence. By adding the requirement that such results be reason-
ably foreseeable, the courts can then determine whether the defendant owed a
duty of care to not inflict mental distress upon the plaintiff. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. There is support for this contention that a spouse may suspect a mate of
infidelity if one carries syphilis. By statute, false imputation of syphilis consti-
tutes slander per se. CAL. CMy. CODE § 46 (West Supp. 1980).
Kilbridge advised Mrs. Molien that her husband would also have
to be examined.
Thus, as a result of concluding that plaintiff was a foreseeable
victim of defendant's tortious conduct, the court held that the de-
fendant owed plaintiff a duty to exercise due care in diagnosing
the physical condition of his wife. In effect, the court was recog-
nizing that one's interest in freedom from the negligent infliction
of mental distress is a protectable interest.56 Cognizant of this
protectable interest, the courts can look to all the factual circum-
stances, as the court did in Molien, to determine whether the
emotional injury sustained was reasonably foreseeable.
Surely a jury based on their own experiences, as well as upon
all the facts and circumstances of the case, can also determine
whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of mental distress.
Representing the conscience of the community, a jury seems best
able to determine whether the average person would suffer an
emotional injury under the circumstances of a given case. As
Dean Prosser stated:
so far as distinguishing true claims from false ones is concerned, what is
required is rather a careful scrutiny of the evidence supporting the claim;
and the elimination of trivilities calls for nothing more than the same com-
mon sense which has distinguished serious from trifling injuries in other
fields of law.
5 7
2. The Physical Injury Requirement: Should a Plaintiff Be
Allowed To Recover For Negligent Infliction Of
Mental Distress Without Suffering A
Physical Injury?
The Molien court then turned to the issue of whether plaintiff
was barred from recovery by the fact that he had suffered no
physical injury. This was truly the pervasive issue of the case be-
cause the previous state of the law was that there could be no re-
covery of damage for negligently inflicted emotional distress if it
was not accompanied by physical injury. However, the law did en-
title plaintiff to recover damages if plaintiff had suffered a shock
56. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (interests in freedom from negligent infliction of
serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal protection).
57. W. PROSSER at 51. See also Vinicky v. Midland Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 35
Wis. 2d 246, 151 N.W.2d 77 (1967). A 12 year old boy suffered mental distress, e.g.,
frequent and intense nightmares and hysteria, from seeing his unconscious father
after automobile accident caused by defendant's negligence. The jury proved
themselves capable of determining the merits of an emotional injury claim after
examining all the evidence. In Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77
N.W.2d 397 (1956), plaintiff recovered from fright and shock suffered by sisters
when a negligently installed gas pressure regulator in house caused gas to escape
and ignite. The jury proved themselves capable of detecting fraudulent or trivial
claims.
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to the nervous system or other physical harm which was proxi-
mately caused by defendant's negligent conduct.5 8
The primary reason for the physical injury requirement, as the
court pointed out, was that it served as a means of assuring the
legitimacy of the alleged claim.5 9 The court, however, believes
that such barriers to recovery are unnecessary since mental in-
jury today is capable of proof. Since recovery is a question of
proof, it is unnecessary to deny remedy in all cases just because
some claims may be false.60
Nonetheless, the physical manifestation requirement did not
fulfill its objective; it did not ensure that the plaintiff's emotional
injury claim was genuine and serious. The rule was instead used
as in Ver Hagen v. Gibbons61 to arbitrarily limit liability. The dis-
sent in Ver Hagen highlighted the arbitrary characteristics of the
rule, stating that most severe mental disturbances are character-
ized by some physical reaction, and it is often only an "accident of
pleading" that the requirement is not met.62
58. See L.A. COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
No. 12.80 at 523 (6th ed. 1977).
59. Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138, 140, 113 A. 16, 17
(1921) (if no bodily injury then no premise upon which to base a conclusion of
mental suffering). See Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to
Reason, 7 VILLA. L. REV. 232, 233-34 (1962); Note, supra note 14, at 402.
60. The court cites W. PROSSER at 328 in support of this view. See also Ferrara
v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958). In Ferrara, the
court specifically held that freedom from mental disturbance was a protected in-
terest in the state of New York. Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999. The
Ferrara court emphasized that:
[Certain] kinds of mental injury are marked by definite physicial symp-
toms, which are capable of clear medical proof. It is entirely possible to
allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and deny it when there is
nothing to corroborate the claim, or to look for some guarantee of genuine-
ness in the circumstances of the case. The problem is one of adequate
proof, and it is not necessary to deny a remedy in all cases because some
claims may be false. The very clear tendency of recent cases is to refuse
to admit incompetence to deal with the problem and to find some basis for
redress in a proper case.
Id. quoting W. PROSSER at 328.
61. 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970).
62. Justice Wilkie observed:
[A] plaintiff who suffers great emotional distress is entitled to recover
damages from the negligent infliction of such distress. The absence of a
physical manifestation of such distress should not change this result
since severe mental disturbances are almost always characterized by
some type of physical reaction and frequently it is only an accident of
pleading that the adverse consequences complained of are characterized
as mental rather than physical.
Id. at 229, 177 N.W.2d at 87-88.
Thus as the Molien court put it, the physical injury requirement
"encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony." 63
The argument is spurious that emotional harm is easy to feign but
that a physical manifestation is proof of its authenticity. Alleging
and proving a sufficient physical manifestation can be just as eas-
ily feigned as psychological manifestation. 64 As a result, the find-
ing of a physical injury may depend on the ingenuity of counsel in
framing the pleadings. The physical injury requirement is both
overinclusive and underinclusive, as the Molien court points out.
It is overinclusive in that it permits recovery for mental distress
even when the physical injury is trivial. It is underinclusive as it
denies valid claims from being proved. One of the best refuta-
tions of the physical injury rule is that in the trivial injury cases,
all the alleged hazards of fabricated claims are present, and yet
almost all jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to recover in the trivial
injury cases. 65 When the evidence is the same but for the physical
injury, there is no reason to think that a jury would more easily
find the existence of mental distress when a trivial physical injury
is pleaded than where it is not.
The arbitrary denial of recovery in all cases discourages the
bringing of meritorious actions and at the same time allows the
prosecution of fabricated claims, for surely those capable of per-
juring evidence will not hesitate to manufacture one additional
feature of the occurrence, a slight injury, to insure recovery. In
short, the physical injury requirement has proved arbitrary and
unreliable. As Justice Mosk observed: "In our view the at-
tempted distinction between physical and psychological injury
merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof;
whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable in-
jury should not turn on this artificial and often arbitrary classifi-
cation scheme."66
63. 27 Cal. 3d at 929, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
64. For example, the evidence showing that there have been tremors or vomit-
ing comes from the same source as evidence of pure psychological injury, that is,
from the plaintiff himself, his friends, relatives, and physicians. These manifesta-
tions can be easily induced.
65. In Porter v. Del. L. & W. R.R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906), the plaintiff
sustained shock when the defendant's bridge fell while she was walking under it.
She alleged dust fell in her eyes and that something touched her neck. This was
held a sufficient physicial manifestation. Dye v. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co., 135 Mo.
App. 254, 115 S.W. 497 (1909), a common carrier case, found that being cold and wet
was sufficient bodily injury to sustain the cause of action for mental anguish.
There, the plaintiff was frightened by being let off at the wrong station due to the
defendant's negligence. Block v. Pascucci, 111 Conn. 58, 149 A. 210 (1930), also held
physical injury sufficient where the plaintiff fell to the floor from fright; therefore,
suffered some pains in her hands.
66. 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (1980).
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Even if it's true that emotional harm is difficult to prove, this is
not a valid reason for denying recovery to a plaintiff who has over-
come that burden. Difficulty of proof of emotional harm, as well
as the legitimacy and substantiality of the claim, are similar with
respect to the nature of proof which the plaintiff must present.
Therefore, with or without an allegation of physical manifestation,
the trier of fact faces the same kind of task in each case, i.e., that
of determining the veracity of the plaintiff's evidence.
For justification of its disposition of the physical injury require-
ment, the Molien court relies heavily on the Hawaii Supreme
Court case of Rodrigues v. State.67 Rodrigues held that mental
distress actions should be given the status of independent torts,
no longer requiring accompanying physical injury for recovery.
The Hawaii Court reached its conclusion after considering the cu-
mulative impact of psychic stimuli in twentieth century society
and the debilitating effect of mental distress.68 It felt that social
policy could no longer dictate against the need to extend legal
protection 69 and that the criteria for determining the existence of
a duty must change with. a changing society.70 In according negli-
gent infliction of mental distress the status of an independent
tort, the Rodrigues court held that there is a duty to refrain from
the infliction of such distress. 7 1
The Hawaii Court recognized the need to limit liability and, as a
result, held that recovery would be limited to claims of serious
mental distress. 72 Such serious mental distress "may be found
where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable
to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the cir-
cumstances of the case."73 Thus the essential question, the one
which the Molien court adopted from Rodrigues, is the question
of proof. That proof which will support a cause of action for
mental distress will be "some guarantee of genuineness in the cir-
cumstances of the case."74 In Molien, the proof and guarantee of
genuineness was the social stigma attached to syphilis.7 5 It is
67. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
68. Id. at 173-74, 472 P.2d at 520.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 170, 472 P.2d at 518-19.
71. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
72. Id. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
easily predictable that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis and its
probable source would produce marital discord and resulting
emotional distress to a married patient's spouse.
Justice Mosk76 was satisfied that the jurors are best situated to
determine if the guarantee of genuineness exists in a plaintiff's
claim. Mosk's basis for this contention was that the juror's own
experience, as well as expert medical testimony, will provide the
jurors with an adequate basis for weeding out false claims.
A demand for positive medical proof of the plaintiff's mental in-
juries serves to protect defendants from false or frivolous claims.
Such a requirement provides a jury with a solid basis for arriving
at a fair award in cases where the mental injury is real and sub-
stantial. Such proof is available today.77
C. The Dissent
The major thrust of Justice Clark's dissenting opinion centers
around the classic public policy concepts which have been the ba-
sis of American courts' denial of recovery: (1) the fear that there
will be a flood of litigation;7 8 (2) the fear that there will be ficti-
tious claims;79 and, (3) the reluctance to subject a defendant to
unlimited liability out of proportion to his wrongful act.80
The fear of a flood of litigation is based on an expected increase
in fraudulent actions coupled with an increase due to actions
based on mental distress of a trivial nature. This argument has to
contend with two factors. First, those courts which have relaxed
their limitations on recoveries of this type have not experienced
any substantial increase in litigation.8 1 Secondly, aside from prac-
tical considerations, several courts have noted that a court may
76. See note 44 supra.
77. [W]e now possess the tools whereby we can intelligently evaluate
claims of emotional injury. Psychiatry and clinical psychology, while not
exact sciences, can provide sufficiently reliable information relating to the
extent of psychological stress, and to the causal relationship between the
injury and the defendant's conduct, to enable a trier of fact to make intel-
ligent evaluation judgments on a plaintiffs claim. There is no reason to
retain a long-standing legal rule when the factual assumptions underlying
the norm are no longer supportable.
Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 359, 124 N.W.2d 312, 317-18 (1963). See Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 411-13, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67 (1974); W. PROSSER at 328 n.40.
78. See note 32 supra.
79. See note 31 supra.
80. See note 33 supra.
81. E.g., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 405, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263
(1969). In Lambert, supra note 23, at 592, the author asserts: "The truth of the
matter is that the feared flood tide of litigation has simply not appeared in states
following the majority rule allowing recovery of psychic injuries without impact.
The volume of litigation has been heaviest in states following the Mitchell doctrine
and its impact rule." See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
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not refuse to adjudicate a particular type of case simply because
its docket may increase. The duty of a court is to redress legal
wrongs "and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part
of any court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will
give the court too much work to do."82 Thus, a court which denies
recovery for this reason, denies for unsubstantiated administra-
tive reasons wholly unrelated to the primary purpose of the law,
i.e., the redress of legal wrongs.8 3
The second fear, that of fictitious claims, should also be re-
jected. Faced with the tremendous advances which medical sci-
ence has made in recent years, particularly in the area of mental
disorders, such a reason for limiting recovery is unnecessary. 84
In Wilson v. Lund,85 a 1971 wrongful death action in Washing-
ton State, the court talked about the fact that there was no longer
a substantial justification for the denial of recovery for purely
emotional injuries. The court noted that:
Modern-day, advanced psychiatric-phychological knowledge discounts for-
mer somewhat limited and provincial limitations surrounding proof or dis-
proof of such injuries. And, it should be emphasized that 'intangible-
emotional' injuries can and do constitute real and significant harms. 8 6
82. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 37. For further support that a court may not
refuse to adjudicate a particular type of case simply because its work load would
otherwise increase, see Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314, 315 (D. Colo.
1965); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 736, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77-78
(1968); Green v. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909); Batalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 241-42, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1961);
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 412-13, 261 A.2d 84, 89 (1970). The court in Dil-
lon asserted that "[ciourts not only compromise their basic responsibility to de-
cide the merits of each case individually but destroy the public's confidence in
them by using the broad broom of 'administrative convenience' to sweep away a
class of claims a number of which are admittedly meritorious." 68 Cal. 2d at 737,
441 P.2d at 918, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
83. In Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) the court com-
mented that it is the business of the law to remedy wrongs even at the expense of
a flood of litigation. See also Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419,
422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969) (the court stated:
This court has rejected as a ground for denying a cause of action that
there will be a proliferation of claims. It suffices that if a cognizable wrong
has been committed that there must be a remedy, whatever the burden of
the courts. Similarly, it has rejected the argument that recognizing a right
of recovery may increase the number of fraudulent claims, so long as the
damages are not too conjectural).
84. See note 62 supra. See also Comment, supra note 2, at 1248-62 (author dis-
cusses the medical aspects of mental distress and how such distress is today ca-
pable of proof).
85. 80 Wash. 2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971).
86. Id. at 97, 491 P.2d at 1291.
In view of the fact that modern medical science has the capabil-
ity of "satisfactorily establishing the existence, seriousness, and
ramifications of emotional harm,"87 courts can no longer deny re-
covery on the strength of precedents which point to the difficulty
of proving emotional damages.
The dissent's argument that a jury may not be able to distin-
guish between a legitimate claim and a fictitious claim can be ad-
vanced in any situation. In his dissent, Justice Clark cites a
medical study88 stating that questions of the effects of emotional
distress would not be easy ones for jurors. However, the
Supreme Court has noted that:
So long as proper guidance by a trial court leaves the jury free to exercise
its untrammeled judgment upon the worth and weight of testimony, and
nothing is done to impair its freedom to bring in its verdict and not some-
one else's we ought not be too finicky or fearful.8 9
As noted earlier, medical science provides the tools whereby
claims of emotional injury can be adequately evaluated.90 Physi-
cians today are equipped with methods to "accurately detect ma-
lingerers and fraudulent claimants so that such fears [of false
claims] should not be used as an excuse to deny a plaintiff his
right to present his case."9 1 In cases where recovery for mental
distress as a parasitic element has been granted, medical proof of
psychic injuries has been readily accepted.92 If the standard of
proof has been sufficient in these cases, there are no evidentiary
or logical reasons for rejecting such proof in cases involving
mental distress alone. 93
While the dissent is correct in its concern for problems of proof,
such problems, though difficult, are "neither insurmountable nor
unique to mental distress cases and should not prevent a plaintiff
from presenting his case in court."94 Surely a jury in judging the
veracity of a plaintiffs evidence can weigh 95 the probabilities suf-
ficiently to determine the legitimacy of the claim.96
87. Comment, supra note 2, at 1253.
88. Smith, supra note 12, at 193.
89. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 519 (1943).
90. See notes 77 and 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
91. Comment, supra note 2, at 1237. See McMahon v. Bergeson, 9 Wis. 2d 256,
101 N.W.2d 63 (1969) (medical testimony established mental distress was suffered
by the plaintiff apart from the physical impact of the auto accident caused by de-
fendant's negligence); Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis,
and Law, 6 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 428, 430 (1957); Smith, supra note 12, at 56. See
generally Keschner, Simulation of Nervous and Mental Disease, 44 MICH. L. REV.
715 (1946).
92. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
93. See W. PROSSER at 328-30.
94. Comment, supra note 2, at 1248-62.
95. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
96. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 1237 (1971).
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The third public policy concept 97 that the dissent discusses as
reason to deny recovery, rests in the fear that once the rigid lines
drawn by the arbitrary restrictions are erased, a negligent defend-
ant may be rendered susceptible to potentially unlimited liability.
Such a concern is a real danger and is without doubt the motivat-
ing force behind the various limiting doctrines from which the
courts have retreated. Yet, this concern must be balanced against
recognition of the plight of the injured plaintiff. The honest liti-
gant should not be denied redress for an injury which was fore-
seeable and culpably caused by another.
It seems that the requirement of "genuine and serious" mental
distress as adopted by the majority opinion from the Rodrigues9 8
case provides an adequate way to limit liability. Courts and juries
have long applied the standard of conduct of "the reasonable man
of ordinary prudence"9 9 in determining negligence cases. It there-
fore seems reasonable that courts and juries are likewise compe-
tent to apply a standard of serious mental distress;OO and that
such a standard applied in conjunction with medical testimony
and the foreseeability standard, will insure that defendants are
not subjected to unlimited liability which is out of proportion to
his wrongful act.
After examining and analyzing prior decisions, both in Califor-
nia and in other jurisdictions, the majority of the justices'01 in
Molien were convinced that the time had come to recognize the
concept of negligent infliction of emotional distress as an in-
dependent tort. This decision serves as a reminder that the law is
constantly changing, developing new standards, and defining new
limits for novel causes of action.
The evolution in the area of negligently inflicted mental distress
first became apparent in Dillon. In Dillon, California acknowl-
edged that one not directly injured or endangered by forces set in
motion by defendant's negligence might recover damages for
psychic injury. In taking this step, the Dillon court was not re-
jecting the doctrine of stare decisis as one might first think.
Rather, the court was reinforcing the purpose of that doctrine by
realizing that, in order to further public confidence in the law,
97. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
98. See notes 67-74 supra and accompanying text.
99. See W. PROSSER at 150.
100. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 44 supra.
precedent should be adhered to only when based on fundamen-
tally sound logic capable of promoting the public interest. 0 2 The
Dillon court, breaking from past precedent, accepted responsibil-
ity for defining limits on the newly created cause of action, and
took the first step toward appropriate and well-balanced bounda-
ries by establishing criteria for standards of foreseeability of
harm to bystanders. 0 3
Once Dillon was decided, the decision in Molien, dispensing
with the physical injury requirement, was inevitable. The Ameri-
can judiciary has had sufficient time to weigh the virtues and
drawbacks of the standards set forth in Dillon.104 In Molien the
time had come to redefine the boundaries of present causes of ac-
tion for mental distress in order to protect emotional health and
well-being. To move in such a direction is to continue the evolu-
tionary process of the law and to provide a means for its imple-
mentation.
The Molien decision is significant and though it is a natural pro-
gression of the law, it will undoubtedly arouse attention across
the nation. While plaintiffs' attorneys will praise Molien as a
breakthrough, attorneys for defendants will condemn it as over-
ambitious. Also certain to be affected are the liability insurers
who will be busy researching what the probable insurance losses
will be and what premium price increase must be charged to off-
set such losses.
Though Molien cannot be faulted for giving a plaintiff who
claims an emotional injury the chance to present his case, we can
expect some inconsistency in the cases which shall follow. Since
recovery of damages for negligently inflicted mental distress is a
question of proof, those recovering will be those who can con-
vince jurors that a defendant's wrongful conduct proximately
caused such injury, and that such injury was legitimate. Conse-
quently, while one jury is being unsympathetic to plaintiffs' evi-
dence in one case, another jury may be finding in favor of the
plaintiff in a factually similar case. However, such inconsistency
is easier to swallow than a law which would preclude a plaintiff
from presenting his case absent some arbitrary limitation.
Thus, American courts will be carefully considering the liberal
102. Mr. Justice Harlan, in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970), discussed the doctrine of stare decisis in a decision which created a new
cause of action for wrongful death in maritime law. He stated: "[A] judicious re-
consideration of precedent cannot be as threatening to public faith in the judiciary
as continued adherence to a rule unjustified in reason, which produces different
results for breaches of duty in situations that cannot be differentiated in policy."
Id. at 405.
103. See notes 38 supra.
104. Id.
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stand which California has taken in Molien. In their scrutiny,
they must question whether policy is truly promoted by denying
a judicial forum to plaintiffs suffering serious emotional injury
simply because of some arbitrary limitation placed upon recovery.
The time has come for every state to evaluate the needs of soci-
ety and to accept the Molien decision. That is, "where it is estab-
lished by a fair preponderance of the evidence [that] there is a
proximate causal relationship between an act of negligence and
reasonably foreseeable mental and emotional suffering by a rea-
sonably foreseeable plaintiff, [and that mental suffering is genu-
ine and serious], such proven damages are compensable."1 0 5
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has shown the history and policies behind the right
to recover from negligently inflicted mental distress, leading up to
the Molien case. The California Supreme Court evaluated the
right of recovery in Molien and held that the right to recover for
emotional distress caused by a defendant's negligent conduct
should be allowed where it is foreseeable, genuine, and serious in
nature; and that these elements are capable of being proved. Fur-
thermore, no limitation such as a physical manifestation would be
necessary in order for a plaintiff to present his case in court. The
purpose of this article has been to show that the fears which had
kept courts from granting such a cause of action are arbitrary; and
in effect, the Molien case is a logical extention of that never-end-
ing process whereby the law endeavors to keep pace with a
changing society.
MICHAEL P. MESSINA
105. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970).

